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Abstract
The fundamental attribution error (FAE) suggests that people attribute others’ 
behavior, more than their own behavior, to dispositional rather than situational factors. 
The FAE is assumed to be domain general, applying equally to the attribution of all kinds 
of attitudes and personality traits. Based on social exchange theory (Cosmides, 1989), I 
reasoned that people should be particularly vigilant about detecting dispositional traits 
associated with dishonesty because they possess specialized mechanisms dedicated to 
cheater-detection. I hypothesized that dispositions associated with dishonesty would 
more readily enhance the FAE than other traits.
This hypothesis was tested in four experiments using two different methodologies 
adapted from previous FAE research. Studies 1 and 2 used self-reports regarding trait 
attributions about the self and other people. Studies 3 and 4 used a memory task to 
examine the role of dispositional inferences in memory encoding. Results from Studies 1 
and 2 were largely in line with my hypotheses but Studies 3 and 4 failed to demonstrate 
the predicted results.
CHEATER DETECTION AND THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION ERROR: 
A TEST OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY
INTRODUCTION
There has been a great deal of research in psychology focusing on inferential 
biases in judgment and decision-making. Traditional approaches have suggested that 
individuals often make systematic cognitive errors when making judgments and 
decisions. Some research has suggested that we use a limited number of heuristics to 
arrive at approximate predictions. It has been suggested that using these heuristics reduce 
the complexity of the task and allow individuals to quickly make decisions (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973, 1996). These heuristics are sometimes accurate but often lead to errors, 
particularly when there are limitations in cognitive capacities (Stanovich & West, 2000).
To illustrate, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) suggest that one heuristic people use 
in inference prediction is representativeness. That is, they select outcomes that best 
represent the evidence they are given. For example, given a personality sketch of a 
graduate student stating that he is high in intelligence though lacks creativity, has little 
sympathy for others and does not like to interact with others, participants were more 
likely to predict that the graduate student was a computer scientist rather than a doctor, 
educator, etc (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). More specifically, they found that although 
participants were aware that the humanities or education field encompassed many more 
graduate students than computer science, 95% of subjects judged the graduate student to 
study computer sciences rather than education or humanities. Using the 
representativeness heuristic allowed participants to make a quick judgment by ignoring 
base rates, leading to systematic biases in decisions. However, most of the literature on
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judgment and decision-making under uncertainty has focused on asking individuals to 
judge the probabilities of single events, but given little if any content about the situation. 
Human cognitive mechanisms were not designed to focus on single events or abstractions 
but rather to take into account cyclical patterns or observable frequencies of events, such 
as rainfall or the frequency of successful hunts in a particular location (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1996; DeKay, Haselton, & Kirkpatrick, 2000). Thus, it is not surprising that 
individuals make errors when performing abstract reasoning problems.
According to evolutionary psychologists, we do not have a few general content- 
independent cognitive systems designed to operate according to rational mathematical 
procedures to produce valid answers in all domains. This type of system is inadequate 
compared to a system with many different content-dependent mechanisms where the 
system is able to better solve specific problems more rapidly. For example, Mineka 
(1992) suggests that primates and humans are biologically predisposed to easily associate 
certain kinds of objects or situations with aversive events. Results of several studies 
using laboratory-reared monkeys suggest that there is an evolved predisposition to 
acquire fear of objects and/or situations that once posed a threat to early ancestors. 
Laboratory-reared monkeys quickly acquired a strong fearful reaction to snakes after 
watching wild-reared monkeys react fearfully around snakes. This type of phobic 
reaction did not occur after watching wild-reared monkeys react fearfully to other objects 
such as flowers.
To take a second example, using the same cognitive machinery for discriminating 
potential mates and potential threats would have been ineffective and often detrimental. 
These problems are distinct problems repeatedly faced throughout evolutionary history.
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Therefore, specialized cognitive machinery evolved to solve these separate adaptive 
problems: a system for discerning potential mates and a system for discerning potential 
threats in the environment. Having different, specialized mechanisms to solve these 
problems allows each to be solved more effectively (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
One reason, according to evolutionary psychologists, that systematic reasoning 
errors occur is because cognitive mechanisms are designed with inherent biases. Error 
Management Theory (EMT; Haselton & Buss, 2000) suggests that relative costs and 
benefits of false positive and false negative decisions were often asymmetric throughout 
evolutionary history. Thus, natural selection favored psychological mechanisms that 
were biased to make the least costly kind of error. Natural selection will not select 
decision rules that are strictly based on what is likely to be true, but rather based on 
whether the decision rules lead to a higher rate of survival and reproductive success.
Thus, selecting a decision rule that always seeks the truth may be more dangerous than a 
rule that is less accurate in truth detection. For example, squirrels hear sounds and run 
away, even though more often than not, the sound was not caused by a predator.
Squirrels in the ancestral environment that did not behave this way more than likely 
would have been eaten. Thus, this strategy potentially decreases their survival and 
reproductive success. However, squirrels with cognitive mechanisms that bias them to 
overestimate the presence of a snake in the grass, and therefore avoid it, decrease their 
chances of being bitten and dying from a snake bite. This bias to avoid unfamiliar 
objects in the grass may lead to a greater chance of survival and more reproductive 
opportunities, thereby potentially aiding in reproductive success.
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Social cognitive mechanisms in humans may be biased by design in a similar 
manner. For example, Haselton and Buss (2000) found that when presented with 
ambiguous cues men tend to overestimate women’s sexual intent whereas women tended 
to underestimate men’s willingness to commit to a relationship. In ancestral 
environments, the cost of men falsely inferring women’s sexual intent was miniscule 
compared to underestimating women’s sexual intent. Men who falsely inferred that 
women were interested would have lost only a small amount of time and energy, but men 
who underestimated women’s sexual intent would have lost potentially valuable sexual 
opportunities. For women, the costs of deciding the commitment intent of a potential 
mate were also asymmetrical. Women who underestimated men’s intent to commit to a 
relationship were more likely to avoid men who were unwilling to commit, thereby 
avoiding the potential consequences associated with such a relationship (e.g. lost 
resources and unwanted pregnancy). Thus, this research suggests that humans have 
evolved social cognitive mechanisms biased to make decisions that resulted on average in 
lower survival and reproductive costs.
Social Exchange Theory and the Wason Task
Social exchange is the “cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual 
benefit” (Cosmides, 1989). By living in small social groups where individuals had 
repeated interaction with others within the group, it was advantageous for our hunter- 
gatherer ancestors to exchange resources for mutual benefit (Trivers, 1971). However, 
exchange of resources between individuals (or groups) also allowed for the possibility of 
cheating by failing to reciprocate in the exchange. Thus, it would have been beneficial to 
be able to recognize cheating in exchange relationships. This is in line with the
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evolutionary theory of reciprocal altruism, according to which reciprocity could not 
develop as a stable strategy unless there was also some way to recognize and punish 
cheaters (Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971).
Cosmides (1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, 1997) used the Wason card selection 
task to test the hypothesis that the human mind has specialized mechanisms to operate in 
social exchange relationships, specifically social contracts, i.e. “a situation in which an 
individual is obligated to satisfy a requirement of some kind, usually at some cost to him- 
or herself, in order to be entitled to receive a benefit from another individual (or group)” 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, p. 180). Cheating, by taking a benefit without satisfying the 
requirement, is a violation of a social contract.
The Wason selection task has traditionally been used to examine human reasoning 
mechanisms with regard to abstract reasoning problems. Participants are asked to look 
for violations of a conditional rule in the form of “if P then Q”. In studies using the 
Wason card selection task (Wason, 1966) participants are typically presented with a 
vignette describing a situation and a particular conditional rule that must be followed. 
Below the vignette are four cards and participants are asked to identify the card(s) that 
need to be turned over to see if the conditional rule had been violated. Fewer than 25% 
of participants answer these types of logical reasoning questions correctly, even when the 
content of the rules are familiar (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997). Cosmides (1989) suggests 
that individuals are not good at reasoning about conditional rule violations in the form of 
logical reasoning tasks because abstract reasoning was not a selection pressure faced by 
our ancestors.
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Cosmides (1985, cited in Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) put social contracts in the 
form of a Wason selection task to examine whether people would accurately detect when 
violations (cheating) occurred. In other words, this is a situation in which “one is 
entitled to a benefit only if one has fulfilled a requirement” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997). 
They found that performance on the task improves when reasoning problems are put in 
the form of detecting violations of social contracts. Thus, Cosmides (1989, Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992, 1997) suggest that humans possess mechanisms that were designed to 
detect cheating (i.e. violations of social contract obligations) in social-exchange 
situations.
Most of the literature supporting social exchange theory has used the Wason card 
selection task (Wason, 1966) or variations of it. Using the Wason task limits the ability 
to fully test social exchange theory. The Wason task limits the focus to detecting 
instances of cheating and not cheaters per se, because it cannot determine whether 
individuals are detecting a specific act of cheating in a specific context or whether the 
individuals are thinking about or remembering the particular individual who cheated. 
Psychological mechanisms designed to detect cheating were not designed to detect 
instances of cheating, but were designed to detect and remember cheaters. By 
remembering individuals who had cheated them in the past, individuals would be able to 
avoid interacting with them on future occasions. Whereas past research has focused on 
people’s ability to detect instances of cheating on social contracts, I hypothesize that 
people will also notice and deeply encode the identity of the persons who have engaged 
in cheating behavior. The purpose of this research is to test this aspect of social exchange
theory in an entirely new way, using methodology from social psychology literature 
examining dispositional biases.
Cheater detection can be thought of as an example of attributing dispositional 
characteristics or traits to other people. One area in particular is the correspondence bias. 
Correspondence Bias and the Fundamental Attribution Error
A vast amount of research in social cognition shows that observers tend to readily 
attribute the cause of a target person’s behavior in terms of dispositional factors and 
underestimate the influence of situational characteristics. This effect is known as the 
fundamental attribution error (FAE; Ross, 1977) or the correspondence bias (Jones & 
Harris, 1967). For example, an observer watches an individual speed down a highway, 
passing others whenever opportunities arise. If the observer was asked about the 
individual speeding, he or she might give a dispositional inference stating, “He is a jerk” 
or “He is careless.” This explanation ignores the possibility that the individual’s situation 
played any factor in the observed driving behavior. For example, the individual could 
have had a family emergency and was trying to rush home out of concern for a family 
member.
In a classic study, Jones & Harris (1967) had participants read an essay either 
favoring or opposing Fidel Castro communist regime. Some of the participants were 
informed that the writer freely chose the position he or she wrote about. Participants in 
this condition assumed that the writer’s position corresponded to the writer’s true 
attitude. Other participants were informed that the writer had no choice and was assigned 
the position he or she had written about. Participants in this condition also inferred that 
the writer’s position corresponded to the writer’s true attitude even though the writer was
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unable to freely choose his or her position. In other words, participants overestimated the 
weight of dispositional characteristics and gave insufficient weight to situational 
constraints.
Ross et al (1977) showed that the FAE occurred even when the participants were 
explicitly aware of the situational constraints. Individuals were randomly assigned to 
play the role of a quiz show host or a contestant while spectators watched. In front of the 
spectators, the experimenter instructed the quiz show host to create ten challenging 
questions to ask the contestants. Thus, the questions referred to a multitude of topics in 
the host’s store of general knowledge. The contestants answered only about 40 percent 
of the questions correctly. At the conclusion of the game, the spectators rated the general 
intelligence level of both the contestant and the host. The spectators rated the host as 
having a higher level of general knowledge than the contestant. Moreover, the 
contestants, who were fully aware of the situational constraints, rated themselves as 
inferior to their respective partners (i.e. host). Thus, both the contestants and the 
spectators underestimated the constraints of the situation and overestimated the influence 
of dispositional characteristics.
Much of the research involving the FAE has instructed participants to rate the true 
attitude of a target person after reading an essay in which he or she favored or opposed a 
specific issue. These issues included such topics as attitudes toward the Fidel Castro 
communist regime, segregation (Jones & Harris, 1967), the legalization of marijuana 
(Jones, Worchel, Goethas, & Grumet, 1971) and attitudes pertaining to homosexuality 
(Alicke, Zerbst, & LoSchiavo, 1996). These studies have consistently shown that
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individuals overestimate the influence of dispositional characteristics and underestimate 
situational constraints when observing another person’s behavior.
Two Previous Studies o f the FAE
Two previous studies have examined the FAE using different methods. Nisbett, 
Caputo, Legant, and Marecek (1973) hypothesized that individuals interpret the behavior 
of others in dispositional terms (and more in situational terms when interpreting their 
own behavior) because individuals may view others as having more personality traits 
than themselves. They suggested that if individuals consistently perceived their own 
behavior as determined by the situation, but viewed others as having more stable 
personality traits, than individuals should view the behavior of others as more trait- 
determined than their own behavior. The results were consistent with their hypothesis: 
Individuals assigned fewer personality traits to themselves than to other people. Neither 
familiarity with the stimulus person nor age of the person influenced individuals’ 
tendency to assign personality traits.
Winter and Uleman (1984) proposed that individuals make trait inferences at the 
encoding stage of processing behavioral information without instructions or intention to 
do so. To test this hypothesis, Winter and Uleman adapted the encoding specificity 
paradigm developed by Tulving and his colleagues (Thomson & Tulving, 1970; Tulving 
& Thompson, 1973). The basic premise is that what is recalled depends on the similarity 
between the context in which the items were encoded and the context in which the items 
are to be retrieved (Leahey and Harris, 1997; Winter & Uleman, 1984). Thus, Winter 
and Uleman suggest, “an effective retrieval cue for any input will be another piece of 
information that was encoded at the same time” (p. 238). Consequently, Winter and
11
Uleman proposed that if people make trait inferences when encoding observed behavior, 
then these trait inferences should be stored with the memory of the behavior. Thus, they 
hypothesized that dispositional cues would facilitate recall for sentences about behaviors 
because of the inference made by the participants and that dispositional cues would be as 
effective as semantic cues. It was found that dispositional-cued and semantic-cued recall 
were both greater than noncued recall, but not significantly different from each other. In 
other words, this study suggests that consistent with the FAE, individuals do formulate 
trait inferences when processing behavioral information at the encoding stage.
These two studies illustrate very different methodologies for assessing the FAE. 
One is about making trait inferences about the self and others, whereas the other 
examines the unintentional encoding of trait inferences at the time of processing observed 
behavioral information. Yet, these two studies converge on the same basic finding: 
Individuals attribute dispositional traits to others to describe their personality as well as 
their behavior.
The Present Studies
Consistent with other FAE research, these studies examined how people make 
inferences about dispositions and traits in general. It appears that there has been an 
assumption that traits are interchangeable with regard to eliciting the FAE. That is, the 
FAE occurs with respect to traits and attitudes of all kinds. Previous researchers seem to 
assume that the FAE is content-independent and highly general, and equally applicable to 
attitudes, personality traits, and dispositions. An evolutionary view raises questions 
about this assumption. Human psychological mechanisms were designed to solve 
adaptive problems faced by our ancestors throughout human evolutionary history. The
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mind did not develop a general-purpose design where a few mechanisms operate the 
same regardless of the content of the problem (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1997). Thus, the mind developed a number of specialized mechanisms designed 
to solve specific adaptive problems faced by our ancestors.
Cheating in social exchange, as discussed previously, is one such problem faced 
by our hunter-gatherer ancestors. It would have been very costly, in inclusive-fitness 
terms, for our hunter-gatherer ancestors not to detect and remember individuals who 
cheat. If our ancestors had repeatedly participated in exchange relationships with 
cheaters, they would have continually lost valuable resources. Therefore, as suggested by 
social exchange theory, humans developed psychological mechanisms designed 
specifically to detect and remember cheaters. As research based on social exchange 
theory has shown, individuals are good at detecting violations of social contracts.
Moreover, individuals should not only detect and remember cheaters, but they 
should also assign dishonest dispositional traits to cheaters to help them avoid future 
interactions with those individuals. This suggests that social exchange theory can fit into 
a FAE framework. The dishonest dispositional quality of a cheater is more relevant than 
a particular situation involving cheating because social exchange theory focuses on 
psychological processes that are necessary for reciprocal altruism. In order for reciprocal 
altruism to occur, one needs partners that will reliably reciprocate, and by assigning 
dishonest dispositions to individuals that cheat, one is able to discriminate potential 
reciprocators from potential nonreciprocators.
Thus, I suggest that the FAE is not content-independent and that not all 
dispositions equally activate the FAE. In line with social exchange theory, I hypothesize
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that cheating behavior on the part of a target will more readily activate the FAE than 
other dispositional characteristics because of evolved psychological mechanisms to detect 
cheaters. Consequently, I predict that people will more readily infer a dishonest 
disposition in individuals who display dishonest behavior than they infer other 
dispositions from other kinds of behaviors.
In this thesis, I describe four studies adapted from the two aforementioned studies. 
Study 1 and Study 2 are adapted from Nisbett et al. (1973) and used self-reports 
regarding trait attributions about the self and other persons. These studies incorporate 
traits that are associated with dishonesty and honesty to examine whether the effects of 
the FAE are stronger for cheating-related traits than other traits.
Study 3 and Study 4 are adapted from Winter and Uleman (1984) using the 
memory task to examine the role of dispositional inferences in memory encoding. In 
Study 3, sentences implying dishonest, mean, and obnoxious dispositions were created to 
examine whether sentences implying dishonesty on the part of the actor in the sentence 
were remembered better relative to the other implied negative dispositions. In Study 4, 
the “dishonest” category was further subdivided into behaviors more versus less directly 
reflective of social-contract violations.
CHAPTER I:
STUDY 1
Study 1 was designed to be as similar to Nisbett et al (1973) as possible, but 
modified to measure the attributions of dishonesty-related traits separately from other 
kinds of traits. Nisbett et al. (1973) had participants fill out a questionnaire with respect 
to themselves and other persons, indicating which of three terms best fit the person in 
question. The participants were to choose between two trait terms that were polar 
opposites such as, “unassuming -  self asserting” or a third phrase “depends on the 
situation.” They chose trait adjectives that were equal in social desirability to eliminate 
the possibility of participants choosing one trait over its polar opposite because it was 
more socially desirable. In accordance with the FAE literature, participants attributed 
fewer traits to themselves than to other people and applied the “depends on the situation” 
option to themselves more than to other people. Nisbett et al. (1973) did not examine 
whether there were differences in the types of trait adjectives that participants applied to 
themselves and others. I suggest that there will be differences in the types of traits 
applied to the self versus another person. I predict that participants will apply traits 
associated with dishonesty more to others (than the self) and more than other negative 
traits. In addition, I predict that participants will apply traits associated with honesty 
more to the self (than to others) and more than other positive traits.
14
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Method
Participants. Forty-seven Introductory Psychology students (26 men and 21 
women, mean age 19.57) from the College of William & Mary participated for course 
credit.
Materials. Materials were adapted from Nisbett et. al.’s (1973) Trait Attribution 
Questionnaire (See Appendix A for complete questionnaire). Each item required 
participants to judge themselves with respect to a particular trait, classifying themselves 
as either like the trait or “it depends on the situation,” and then to make the same 
judgment about a.friend and an acquaintance. This format was different than Nisbett et 
al. format of the questionnaire on which participants judged themselves with respect to 
bipolar pairs of traits. Nisbett et al. designed their bipolar pairs to be equal in social 
desirability to avoid participants assigning traits because they were more or less desirable 
than their bipolar counterparts. This would not have been the case with some of my 
bipolar pairs since traits pertaining to dishonesty would be less socially desirable than 
traits pertaining to honesty. For this study, I added six positive traits associated with the 
opposite of cheating (e.g. trustworthy, sincere), six positive traits not associated with 
cheating (e.g. friendly, cheerful), six negative traits associated with cheating (e.g. 
fraudulent, deceitful), and six negative traits not associated with cheating (e.g. unskilled, 
lazy). I also used six of the traits from the original study that I am calling neutral traits 
(e.g. lenient, easygoing). To avoid the possibility of individuals simply assigning the 
more socially desirable trait to themselves and undesirable traits to others, I decided to 
have participants choose between “trait A” or “depends on the situation.” Participants
16
also completed the same questionnaire for a friend and an acquaintance. The order of the 
questionnaires was counterbalanced to eliminate the possibility of order effects.
Procedure. Upon arrival, participants were told that the study examined how 
individuals describe themselves and others. Participants were told that their participation 
was completely anonymous and voluntary and that they could choose to stop at anytime 
without losing their research credit. Participants then read and signed the informed 
consent form. After completion of the informed consent form, the Trait Attribution 
Questionnaire was handed out. The participants were instructed that there were three 
forms, one pertaining to them, one pertaining to a friend and one pertaining to an 
acquaintance. The participants were instructed to complete the questionnaire by checking 
the blank that best describes them for each number. For the questionnaire pertaining to a 
friend, participants were instructed to think of a close friend. For the questionnaire 
pertaining to the “other” person, participants were instructed to think of a person they 
know who was not a close friend or enemy. The participants were then asked to think of 
an acquaintance with whom they do not necessarily interact on a day-to-day basis. The 
participants were given a moment to think of people for these categories. Once the 
participants had thought of the individuals, they were asked if there were any questions. 
The participants had instructed to begin the questionnaire. Once all the participants were 
finished the questionnaire, they were debriefed. Participants interested in the results of 
the study gave their name an email address in order to receive a copy of the abstract.
Results and Discussion 
There were a total of 30 traits with traits being broken down into five categories— 
dishonest, negative, honest, positive, and neutral—with six traits in each category.
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Scoring for each trait was dichotomous: The question received a 1 if the trait was 
checked and received a zero if "depends on the situation" was checked. Scores for each 
trait were constructed by summing across the six items per trait. Separate analyses were 
conducted for positive and negative traits. (For present purposes, data for the neutral 
traits were not analyzed) Each of these was a 2 (Sex) X 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) mixed 
model ANOVA, followed by contrasts. In each analysis, the crucial theoretical test 
involved the Trait X People interaction (see Tables 1 and 2 for descriptive statistics). 
Dishonesty versus Other Negative Traits
A 2 (Sex) X 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVA revealed a marginally significant Sex 
X Trait X People interaction, F  (2, 44) = 2.585,/? = .087.1 No other effects were 
significant. Due to the marginally significant 3-way interaction, I then conducted 
separate 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVA for each sex.
Men. A 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVA revealed no significant effects. Most 
importantly, the Trait X People interaction was not significant, F  (2, 24) = .431,/? = .655. 
The 2-way ANOVA was then repeated using a contrast of Self versus Friend for the 
people effect. This analysis also produced no significant results, F  (1, 25) = .684, p  = 
.416. The 2-way ANOVA was again repeated using a contrast of Self versus Other for 
the people effect. This analysis also produced no significant results, F  (1, 25) = .375,/? = 
.546.
Women. A  2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVA produced a marginally significant 
interaction, F  (2,19) = 3.182,/? = .064. As predicted (see Figure 1), women attributed 
fewer dishonest traits to self than other negative traits (.05 and .24 respectively) but for 
friend and other the pattern reverses: Women attributed slightly more dishonest traits than
18
other negative traits to friend, (.38 and .29 respectively) but attributed a much higher 
number of dishonest trait than other negative traits to other (.71 and .38 respectively). A 2 
(Trait) X (Self Versus Other) contrast revealed a marginally significant main effect for 
self versus other, F  (1, 20) = 3.155, p =  .091, with participants attributing more traits to 
other than to self (.55 and .14 respectively). There was also a marginally significant 
interaction, F  (1, 20) = 3.689, p  = .069. Participants attributed more other negative traits 
to the self than dishonest traits (.24 and .05 respectively) but attributed more dishonest 
traits to the other than other negative traits (.71 and .38 respectively). However, the 
interaction for Self versus Friend was not significant, F  (1, 20) = 1.538,/? = .229.
Honesty versus Other Positive Traits
A 2 (Sex) X 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
people, F  {2, 44),/? < .001, with participants attributing more traits to friend (4.76) 
followed by self (4.32) and other (3.36). As predicted, there was a significant Trait X 
People interaction, F  (2, 44) = 5.060,/? = 011. As Figure 2 illustrates, participants 
attributed more honest traits to self than other positive traits (4.70 and 3.95 respectively) 
and attributed slightly fewer honest traits to friend as other positive traits (4.71 and 4.81 
respectively). In contrast, participants attributed slightly fewer honest traits to 
acquaintance than other positive traits (3.19 and 3.53 respectively). A 2 (Trait) X 2 (Self 
versus Friend) contrast yielded a significant interaction, F  (1, 45) = 7.167, p  = .010. 
Participants attributed more honest traits to self than other positive traits (4.70 and 3.95 
respectively) but attributed slightly fewer honest traits to friend than other positive traits 
(4.71 and 4.81 respectively). In addition, a 2 (Trait) X 2 (Self versus Other) contrast 
produced a significant interaction, A( l ,  45) = 7.797,/? = .008. Participants attributed
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more honest traits to self than other positive traits (4.70 and 3.95 respectively) but 
attributed slightly less honest traits to acquaintance than other positive traits (3.19 and 
3.53 respectively).
In addition, there was a marginally significant Sex X Trait X People interaction, F  
(2, 44),/? =. 071, suggesting that the 2-way interaction maybe different for men and 
women. Therefore, I conducted separate 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVAS for each sex.
Men. A 2 (Trait) X (People) ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for 
people, F  (2, 24) = 9.855,/? = .001, with men overall attributing more traits to friend 
(4.69) followed by self (4.28) and other (3.28). The Trait X People interaction was not 
significant, F  (2, 24) = .208,/? = .814. Analyses using contrasts produced no significant 
interactions.
Women. A 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for 
people, F  (2, 19) = 13.451,/? < .001, with women overall attributing more traits to friend 
(4.83) followed by self (4.36) and other (3.43). As predicted, there was also a significant 
Trait X Person interaction, F  (2, 19) = 7.304, p  = .004, with women attributing more 
honest attributes than other positive attributes to the self (4.86 and 3.86 respectively) but 
for friend and other, women attribute more other positive traits than honest traits (friend: 
5.05 and 4.62, other: 3.91 and 2.95 respectively). A 2 (Trait) X 2 (Self versus Friend) 
contrast produced a significant interaction, F  (1, 20) = 9.009,/? = .007, with women 
attributing more honest traits than other positive traits to self (4.86 and 3.86 respectively) 
but attributing more other positive traits to the other than honest traits (3.91 and 2.95 
respectively). A 2 (Trait) X 2 (Self versus Other) contrast also produced a significant 
interaction, 7^(1, 20) = 13.236,/? = .002, with women attributing more honest traits to the
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self than other positive traits (4.86 and 3.86 respectively) but attributing more other 
positive traits to the other than honest traits (3 .91 and 2.95 respectively).
In Study 1, the predictions received mixed support. For dishonest versus other 
negative traits, the predicted trait x people interaction was nonsignficant when men and 
women were combined but was marginally significant for female participants when 
analyzed separately. However, predictions for honest versus other positive traits were 
supported. Participants were more likely to attribute positive traits to themselves than 
others but the effect was significantly stronger for honesty-related traits than other 
positive traits.
Several problems in the design of this study might have weakened the results. 
First, scoring the traits dichotomously restricts the variability. Therefore, a modification 
made in Study 2 was to have participants make attributions using a 10-point scale from 0 
to 9 (0 being completely dependent on the situation and 9 being highly characteristic of 
the person [being described] in general) to produce more variability.
Another potential confound was that when thinking of a person for the friend and 
other categories, participants were given no specific guidelines as to age or sex of the 
persons whom they were to describe. For example, a participant thinking of his/her 
grandmother for the category other may make attributions about her much differently 
than a participant who was thinking of a person they might want to date in the future. 
Thus, these are qualitatively different individuals who may have very different attributes 
made about them. This variability is a source of error likely to weaken the results. Thus, 
an improvement in Study 2 was that for all categories individuals were asked to think of a 
specific same-sex individual from the College of William & Mary.
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In addition, the comparisons of honest and dishonest to other positive and other 
negative traits involved comparing a group of six traits associated with honesty or 
dishonesty with a general and diverse group of six positive or negative traits. In other 
words, there was not a clustering theme for the other positive and negative traits as there 
was for honesty and dishonesty. Also, there were no a priori ratings of how negatively or 
how positively the attributes were viewed. Consequently, some adjectives may have 
been viewed more negatively or more positively than other traits. Study 2 was therefore 
modified to deal with this problem as well.
CHAPTER II:
STUDY 2
As previously stated, Study 2 was a modification of Study 1. Scoring for traits 
was modified from dichotomous to a 10-point scale. The term used for a person with 
whom the individual does not interact on a day-to-day basis was changed from other to 
acquaintance to help give the category a clearer meaning. In addition, participants were 
asked to think of specific same-sex individuals from the College of William and Mary for 
each person category. (A fourth category of disliked other was added for exploratory 
purposes and was not used in any subsequent analyses.) Finally, the traits used were 
modified from Study 1 to include the negative traits mean and obnoxious, the positive 
traits kind and intelligent, and the neutral traits ordinary and passive. As in Study 1, for 
the present purposes, data for the neutral traits were not analyzed.
Method
Participants. Fifty-nine Introductory Psychology students (27 men and 32 
women, mean age 19.56) from the College of William & Mary participated in exchange 
for course credit.
Materials. Materials were adapted from the previous study’s Trait Attribution 
Questionnaire. As in the previous study, participants judged themselves with respect to a 
particular trait. However, in this study, instead of having participants make a 
dichotomous decision (i.e., the trait or depends on the situation), individuals were asked
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to rate themselves on a 10 point scale (0 completely dependent on the situation and 9 
being highly characteristic of the person in general).
In Study 1, there was a diverse collection of negative traits compared to 
dishonesty. A more appropriate to comparison, however, would involve the specific trait 
of dishonesty with one or more specific negative trait(s). The same is true for honesty.
In addition, it seems important that the other two negative traits be comparably negative 
or undesirable to dishonesty. Similarly, all three positive traits should be comparably 
desirable. Thus, I chose the specific trait categories, mean and obnoxious, and, kind and 
intelligent, based on Anderson’s (1968) likableness ratings.
The total number of traits was expanded from 30 to 48. For the positive spectrum 
of adjectives this study, there were six traits associated with honesty, six traits associated 
with the positive trait understanding, six traits associated with the positive trait 
intelligent. For the negative spectrum of adjectives in this study, there were six traits 
associated with dishonesty, six negative traits associated with the adjective mean, and six 
traits associated with the adjective obnoxious. Two clusters of neutral traits were also 
used, a cluster of six traits associated with the adjective ordinary and six traits associated 
with the trait passive. These traits were also chosen from Anderson’s (1968) likableness 
ratings. Participants also completed the same questionnaire for a friend, an acquaintance, 
and a disliked other. The order of the questionnaires was counterbalanced to eliminate 
the possibility of order effects (see Appendix B for complete questionnaires).
Procedure. Upon arrival to the study, participants were told that the study 
examined how individuals describe themselves and others. Participants were told that 
their participation was completely anonymous and voluntary and that they could choose
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to stop at anytime without losing their research credit. Participants read and signed the 
informed consent form. After completion of the informed consent form, the Trait 
Attribution Questionnaire was handed out. The participants were instructed that there 
were four forms, one pertaining to them, one pertaining to a friend, one pertaining to an 
acquaintance, and one pertaining to a disliked other. For the questionnaire labeled friend , 
they were told to think of a specific, same-sex close friend from William & Mary. For 
the questionnaire labeled acquaintance, they were instructed to think of a specific, same- 
sex individual from William & Mary whom they neither strongly liked nor disliked. For 
the questionnaire labeled disliked other, participants were instructed to think of a specific, 
same-sex person from William & Mary whom they disliked. The participants were given 
a moment to think of specific people for each category. Participants were then asked if 
there were any questions, and then instructed to begin the questionnaires. Once all the 
participants finished the questionnaires, they were debriefed.
Results and Discussion 
There were a total of 48 traits in eight categories—dishonest, mean obnoxious, 
honest, kind, intelligent, ordinary and passive—with six traits in each category. Scoring 
for each trait was on a 10-point scale, 0 being completely dependent on the situation and 
9 being highly characteristic o f  the person in general. Scores for each trait were 
constructed taking the mean for the six items per trait. In addition, contrasts were created 
to form what I will call other positive and other negative traits. The traits kind and 
intelligent were averaged together to form other positive traits and the traits mean and 
obnoxious were averaged together to form other negative traits. This was done so that 
analyses would be comparable to those of Study 1 (i.e. honest traits being compared to
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other positive traits and dishonest traits being compared to other negative traits).
Separate analyses were done for positive and negative traits. Each of these was a 2 (Sex) 
X 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) mixed model ANOVA, followed by contrasts. As in Study 1, in 
each analysis, the crucial theoretical test involved the Trait X People interaction (see 
Tables 3 and 4 for descriptive statistics).
Dishonesty versus Other Negative Traits
A 2 (Sex) X 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
trait, F  {1, 57) = 15.233,/? = .0012, with other negative traits being attributed more than 
dishonest in general (1.89 and 1.46). There was also a significant main effect for people, 
F  (2, 56) = 5.998,/? = 004, with overall more traits being attributed to acquaintance (1.92) 
followed by self (1.71) and friend (1.38). There was also a significant main effect for 
sex, F  (1, 57) = 6.380, p  — .014, with men making more trait attributions than women 
(1.96 and 1.38 respectively).
As predicted, there was a significant Trait X People interaction, F  (2, 56) = 7.917, 
p  = .001. As Figure 3 illustrates, participants attributed fewer dishonest traits to self than 
other negative traits (1.35 and 2.08 respectively). This pattern is similar for friend, with 
dishonesty being attributed less than other negative traits (1.07 and 1.69 respectively). 
However, participants attributed slightly more dishonest traits to acquaintance than other 
negative traits (1.95 and 1.90 respectively). A 2 (Trait) X 2 (Self versus Acquaintance) 
contrast also yielded a significant interaction, F  {1, 57) = 12.242,p  = .001. Participants 
attributed more other negative traits to the self than dishonest traits (2.08 and 1.35 
respectively) but attribute slightly more dishonest traits to acquaintance than other 
negative traits (1.95 and 1.90 respectively). However, the interaction contrast for Self
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versus Friend was not significant, F  (1, 57) = 2.60, p  = .612. There was also a marginally 
significant Sex X Trait X People interaction, F  (2, 56) = 2.595, p  = .084, suggesting that 
the 2-way interaction may be different for men and women. Therefore, I conducted 
separate 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVAs for each sex.
Men. A 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVA revealed a marginally significant main 
effect for trait, F (1, 26) = 3.229, p =  .084, with other negative traits being attributed 
more than dishonest traits by men in general (2.14 and 1.78). There was also a 
significant main effect for people, F  (2, 25) = 3.154,/? = .060, with men attributing more 
traits to acquaintance (2.32) followed by self (1.95) and friend (1.62). As predicted, there 
was a significant Trait X People interaction, F  (2, 25) = 4.781 ,/? = .017. Men attributed 
fewer dishonest traits to the self than other negative traits (1.47 and 2.43 respectively). 
Similarly, men attributed less dishonest traits to friend than other negative traits (1.44 and 
1.80 respectively). However, men attributed more dishonest traits to acquaintance than 
other negative traits (2.44 and 2.19 respectively).
A 2 (Trait) X 2 (Self versus Friend) contrast produced a marginally significant 
main effect, F  (I, 26) = 3.655,/? = .067, with men overall attributing more traits to the 
self than friend (1.95 and 1.62 respectively). The main effect for Self versus 
Acquaintance contrast was not significant, F  (1, 26) = 1.130,/? = .298. A 2 (Trait) X 2 
(Self versus Acquaintance) contrast produced a significant interaction, F  (I, 26) = 9.799, 
p  = .004, with men attributing less dishonest traits than other negative traits to 
acquaintance (2.44 and 2.19 respectively). However, the interaction for Self versus 
Friend contrast was not significant, F  (1, 26) = 2.479,/? = .127.
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Women. A 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
trait, F ( l ,  31) = 19.421,/? < .001, with other negative traits being attributed more than 
dishonest traits by women in general (1.64 and 1.13). There was also a marginally 
significant main effect for people, F  (2, 30) = 2.680,/? = .085, with women overall 
attributing more traits to acquaintance (1.53) followed by self (1.48) and friend (1.14).
As predicted, there was a significant Trait X People interaction, F  (2, 30) = 4.479,/? = 
.020. Women attributed fewer dishonest traits to the self than other negative traits (1.23 
and 1.72 respectively). Similarly, women attributed fewer dishonest traits to friend than 
other negative traits (0.70 and 1.57 respectively). The same pattern was true for 
acquaintance, with dishonest traits being attributed less than other negative traits (1.45 
and 1.62 respectively). A 2 (Trait) X 2 (Self versus Friend) contrast produced a 
marginally significant main effect, F ( 1,31) = 3.668, p  — .065, with women overall 
attributing more traits to self than friend (1.48 and 1.14 respectively). The Self versus 
Acquaintance main effect was not significant, F ( l ,  31) = .065,/? = .801.
Honesty versus Other Positive Traits
A 2 (Sex) X 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for
people F  (2, 56) = 18.903, p  < .001, with overall more traits being attributed to friend
(7.11) followed by self (6.85) and acquaintance (5.93). As predicted, there was a 
significant Trait X People interaction, F  (2, 56) = 4.489,/? = .016. As Figure 4 illustrates, 
participants attributed a similar amount of honest traits to self as other positive traits 
(6.84 and 6.86 respectively). Participants also attributed a similar amount of honest traits 
to friend as other positive traits (7.18 and 7.03 respectively). However, participants 
attribute slightly less honest traits to acquaintance than other positive traits (5.78 and 6.08 
respectively). A 2 (Trait) X 2 (Self versus Acquaintance) contrast yielded a marginally
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significant interaction, F  {1, 57) = 3.178,/? = .080. Participants attributed a similar 
amount of honest traits and other positive traits to self (6.84 and 6.86 respectively) but 
attributed slightly less honest traits to acquaintance than other positive traits (5.78 and 
6.08 respectively). The Self versus Friend contrast did not produce a significant 
interaction, F  (1, 57) = 1.052, p  = .309. There was not a significant 3-way interaction so 
separate 2 (Trait) X 3 (People) ANOVAs for each sex were not conducted.
The results were consistent with my predictions. The trait by target interaction 
was significant with the magnitude of the FAE stronger for dishonesty-related traits than 
other negative traits. With respect to positive traits, the FAE was “reversed” in that 
people were more likely to attributed positive traits to themselves than to other and this 
effect was enhanced for honesty-related traits.
CHAPTER III:
STUDY 3
Winter and Uleman (1984) suggested that trait inferences are made automatically 
at the encoding stage of processing behavior information. They had participants read 
sentences describing individuals performing different actions that implied traits. 
Participants were later asked to recall the sentences under one of three types of cueing 
conditions: a dispositional cue, a non-dispositional semantic cue, or no cue. They found 
that recall for sentences was best for participants cued by dispositional words (though not 
significantly different from semantic cues), suggesting that participants made (though not 
deliberately) trait inferences during encoding.
Winter and Uleman (1984) examined whether dispositional cues elicited greater 
recall of sentences than either semantic cues or no cues. They did not examine whether 
there was a difference between different dispositions with respect to the number of 
sentences recalled. I hypothesized that specific trait dispositions would be encoded more 
readily than other dispositions and thereby increase recall for the corresponding 
sentences. Specifically, I suggest that dishonesty is one such disposition. It is predicted 
that when the behavior of the actor in the sentences implies dishonesty, the sentences will 
be remembered better than sentences implying other types of dispositions.
The method was adapted from Winter and Uleman’s (1984) study.3 There were 
21 sentences, seven sentences implying & dishonest disposition, seven sentences implying
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a mean disposition, and seven sentences implying an obnoxious disposition. These traits 
were selected to correspond to the negative traits in Study 2.
Method
Participants. Thirty-three Introductory Psychology students (16 men and 17 
women, mean age 19.00) from the College of William & Mary participated in exchange 
for course credit.
Materials. The 21 sentences were presented one at a time using Microsoft Power 
Point. Each sentence implied a dispositional characteristic about the individual in the 
sentence. The sentences were constructed so that the individual in the sentence was 
behaving in a dishonest, mean, or obnoxious manner toward the reader of the sentences 
(see Appendix C for a complete list of the sentences). Sample sentences are, “The 
butcher eavesdrops on your conversation” and “The waitress fails to give you gas money 
for a long trip.” Following the sentences, there were three slides containing a distracter 
task. Instructions for the distracter task were on one slide and the other two slides each 
displayed three anagrams. After completion of the slide show, each subject received a 
recall sheet with one column to list the person/occupations of the sentences and one 
column to list the behaviors of the persons in the sentences. More instructions were 
given to also draw lines to as best they could, to match the people with the appropriate 
behaviors.
Procedure. Participants signed up for the study on the research pool sign up 
board. Upon arrival to the study, participants were told that they were participating in a 
memory experiment. Participants were told that their participation was completely 
anonymous and voluntary and that they could choose to stop at anytime without losing
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their research credit. Participants then read and signed the informed consent form. They 
were told that they would be shown 21 sentences one at a time and were be asked to 
study them because they would be tested on them later. Participants then viewed each 
sentence one at a time for 5 seconds. The distracter task followed the presentation of the 
sentences. After the last sentence was displayed, the slide with the instructions to 
unscramble the six anagrams that followed was displayed for 20 seconds. The anagrams 
were shown on two slides, with three anagrams on each slide. Participants were allowed 
1 minute for each slide. The recall sheets for the sentences were then handed out. 
Participants were allowed 10 minutes to recall as many sentences as they could. After the 
recall sheets were collected, the participants were debriefed. Participants interested in the 
results of the study gave their name an email address in order to receive a copy of the 
abstract. There were two sentence orders counterbalanced so the same sentences did not 
appear in the same order across the two sessions.
Results and Discussion 
Each sentence consisted of a person/occupation directing some type of behavior 
toward the individual(s) reading the sentence. The types of behaviors fell into one of 
three categories: dishonest, mean, or obnoxious. Correct recall of the sentences was 
measured using four dependent measures. The first dependent measure was the number 
of people/occupations correctly remembered for each category (see Table 5). The second 
dependent measure was the number of behaviors correctly remembered for each category 
(see Table 6). The third dependent measure was a correct category match (see Table 7). 
This was when the people/occupations remembered were correctly matched with a 
behavior from the appropriate category, though not necessarily the exact behavior. For
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example, suppose that in one sentence “the Sailor” had performed some dishonest 
behavior, such as split the cost of a lottery ticket and keeps all the winnings. Recall was 
scored as a correct category match if the participant listed “Sailor” and matched Sailor to 
any dishonest behavior, including but not necessarily “bought a lottery ticket with you 
and keeps all the money after the ticket wins.” The fourth dependent measure was an 
exact match between the person/occupation and the specific behavior of the sentence (see 
Table 8). Thus, exact matches involve a more stringent criterion and represent a subset 
of category matches. These latter two measures were of primary interest because based 
on social exchange theory, individuals should detect and remember cheaters. But in 
order to remember that an individual had been dishonest or cheated, one should 
remember that the individual behaved dishonestly. However, retrieval of specific 
episodes (i.e., the specific dishonest behavior) is not necessary for making trait judgments 
(Cosmides, Klein, & Tooby, 2002). Thus, the primary analyses for this study involves 
correct category matches where recall of specific dishonest behaviors were not necessary. 
The exact category match analysis is important to discern whether participants are 
actually making exact matches or category matches.
There was some leniency used with respect to the scoring of participants wording 
for the persons/occupations and behaviors. For example, a participant listed the 
occupation “road guard” instead of using “crossing guard” and this was counted as a 
correct person/occupation remembered. However, one participant used the word “driver” 
and this was not counted as a correct person/occupation remembered. The closest correct 
person/occupation in the sentences was “chauffer” and it was difficult to discern whether
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this was what the participant intended. Thus, if there was ambiguity as to what the 
participant meant, the response was not counted as a correct response.
The analysis for the number of persons/occupations remembered was a 2 (Sex) X 
2 (Order) X 3 (Trait) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. The analysis 
revealed a marginally significant main effect for trait, F(2, 28) = 2.96, p  = .068.4 The 
pattern of unweighted means were not as predicted. Mean recall for the 
persons/occupations in mean sentences was highest (3.33) followed by recall for the 
persons/occupations in obnoxious sentences (2.85) and recall for the persons/occupations 
in dishonest sentences (2.53).
The analysis for the number of behaviors remembered was a 2 (Sex) X 2 (Order) 
X 3 (Trait) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. No significant results 
were found for any main effects or interactions. However, for the main effect for trait, a 
similar pattern to the persons/occupations remembered emerged. The mean recall for 
mean behaviors was highest (2.38) followed by recall for dishonest behaviors (1.96) and 
obnoxious behaviors (1.77).
The analysis for the number of persons/occupations matched with the correct 
category was a 2 (Sex) X 2 (Order) X 3 (Trait) ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
last factor. Again, the main effect for trait was not significant. As with the previous two 
dependent measures, a similar pattern emerged with the mean recall for mean behaviors 
highest (1.65) followed by recall for obnoxious behaviors (1.25) and dishonest behaviors
(1.11). There was also a significant order effect F{ 1, 29) = 5.84, p  = .022, with 
participants viewing order 1 remembering more category matches than participants 
viewing order 2 (1.66 and 1.00 respectively).
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The analysis for the number of persons/occupations matched with the exact 
behavior of the sentence was a 2 (Sex) X 2 (Order) X 3 (Trait) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor. As with the previous three analyses, no significant results 
were found for the main effect for trait. However the same trend emerged for the trait 
main effect. The mean recall for mean behaviors was highest (1.57) followed by recall for 
obnoxious behaviors (1.22) and dishonest behaviors (1.04). There was again a significant 
order effect F( 1, 29) = 7.27, p  = .012, with participants viewing order 1 remembering 
more exact matches than participants viewing order 2 (1.63 and 0.92 respectively).
I had predicted that the recall for sentences implying dishonesty would be the 
highest. However, this was not the case across all four dependent measures. In fact, 
recall for sentences implying meanness were highest across all four dependent measures. 
It is unclear why this is the case. I will offer some speculations in the General 
Discussion. However, it is important to keep in mind that this was only a trend given that 
there was only one marginally significant main effect for trait (for the number of 
persons/occupations recalled) out of the four dependent measures.
To explore for possibilities as to why the predicted effect was not found, I 
conducted a sentence-by-sentence analysis just examining the dishonest sentences. 
Looking at category matches and exact matches, three of the dishonest sentences ("The 
salesperson makes an expensive long -distance call on your phone without telling you," 
The sailor bought a lottery ticket with you and keeps all the money after the ticket wins," 
and "The waitress fails to give you gas money for a long trip") were correctly recalled at 
a notably higher frequency than the other four sentences (See Table 9). In appears that 
there may be a social contract embedded in these three sentences. Recall that a social
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contract is when one is entitled to a benefit only if one has fulfilled a requirement. Thus, 
in the lottery ticket sentences, it could be suggested that if an individual splits the cost of 
a lottery ticket with you then if the lottery ticket wins, that person must split the winnings 
with you. Consequently, when the individual does not share the lottery winnings, it 
raises the possibility that the individual has broken a social contract. The same logic can 
be applied to the other two sentences mentioned above. The other four dishonest 
sentences do not appear to have such clearly identifiable or salient social contract 
qualities.
This suggests the possibility that my hypotheses, based on social exchange 
theory, should be revised. The trait category “dishonesty” might have been defined to 
broadly in Study 3. Perhaps the memory advantage provided by a dedicated cheater- 
detection mechanism is observed in cases of fairly explicit social contract violations.
This possibility was investigated in Study 4.
CHAPTER IV:
STUDY 4
This Study is designed to compare two different kinds of “dishonest” sentences. 
One kind is a general category of dishonest used in the previous study (e.g. lying, stealing 
etc.) The second kind is sentences involve social contract violations (SCV). These 
sentences were created using the format “if one takes a benefit the one must satisfy a 
requirement,” where the individual in the sentences fails to satisfy the requirement. For 
example, in the sentences, “The editor shares an apartment with you and never pays 
rent,” the editor is taking the benefit of living in the apartment without satisfying the 
requirement of helping to pay the rent.
The number of sentences in Study 4 was expanded from 21 to 29. Four sentences 
were added to the beginning and end to account for possible primacy and recency effects. 
These sentences were not included in any of the analyses. As mentioned above, another 
modification is that the meanness sentences were replaced with social contract violations. 
Thus, the sentence categories for Study 4 were SCV, dishonest, and obnoxious (see 
Appendix D for complete list of sentences).
It is important to consider that in both orders of Study 3, the same 
persons/occupations were paired with the same behaviors. Thus, it is unclear whether 
individuals are remembering the sentences based on the dispositional characteristics of 
the sentences or because the persons/occupations are particularly memorable. Thus, a 
modification made in Study 4 is that persons/occupations are never paired with the same 
behavior more than once across three orders.
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Method
Participants. Sixty-one5 Introductory Psychology students (33 men and 27 
women, mean age 19.10) from the College of William & Mary participated in exchange 
for course credit.
Materials. The 29 sentences were presented one at a time using Microsoft Power 
Point. Four sentences were added to the beginning and end to eliminate primacy and 
recency effects. These sentences were not included in the analyses. The remaining 
sentences and the recall sheet were the same as in Study 3.
Procedure. Participants signed up for the study on the research pool sign up 
board. Upon arrival to the study, participants were told that they were participating in a 
memory experiment, that their participation was completely anonymous and voluntary, 
and that they could choose to stop at anytime without losing their research credit. 
Participants then read and signed the informed consent form. They were told that they 
would be shown 29 sentences one at a time and were be asked to study them because they 
would be tested on them later. Participants then viewed each sentence one at a time for 5 
seconds. The distracter task followed the presentation of the sentences. After the last 
sentence was displayed, the slide with the instructions to unscramble the six anagrams 
that followed was displayed for 20 seconds. The anagrams were shown on two slides, 
with three anagrams on each slide. Participants were allowed 1 minute for each slide.
The recall sheets for the sentences were then handed out. Participants were allowed 10 
minutes to recall as many sentences as they could. After the recall sheets were collected, 
the participants were debriefed. Participants interested in the results of the study gave 
their name an email address in order to receive a copy of the abstract. The order of the
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sentences was counterbalanced across three sessions to ensure that the same 
person/occupation never appeared with the same sentence more than once and that the 
sentences never appeared in the same order more than once.
Results and Discussion 
As in Study 3, each sentence consisted of a person/occupation directing some type 
of behavior toward the individual(s) reading the sentence. However, the categories of 
behaviors were different from those in Study 3. The three categories of behaviors in 
Study 4 were social contract violations (SCV), dishonest, or obnoxious. Consistent with 
Study 3, correct recall of the sentences was measured using the same four dependent 
measures: the number of people/occupations correctly remembered, the number of 
behaviors correctly remembered, the number of correct category matches, and the 
number of exact matches between the person/occupation and the specific behavior of the 
sentence. Again, each of these dependent variables was measured separately for all three 
trait categories (see Tables 10-13 for descriptive statistics for each dependent measure).
The analysis for the number of persons/occupations remembered was a 2 (Sex) X 
2 (Order) X 3 (Trait) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. The main effect 
for trait was not significant, and the pattern of means was contrary to prediction. The 
mean recall for the persons/occupations in obnoxious sentences was highest (2.62) 
followed by the recall for persons/occupations in dishonest sentences (2.48) and the recall 
for persons/occupations in SCV  sentences (2.38). There was a marginally significant 
order effect, F  (2, 54) = 2.77,/? = .071, with participants viewing order 2 recalling more 
persons/occupations than participants viewing order 1 or order 2 (2.80, 2.36, and 2.32 
respectively). In addition, there was a significant Trait X Order interaction, F  (4, 106) =
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2.79, p  = .031 6 The pattern of means for the trait effect was different for each different 
order: For example, the SCV sentences had the lowest mean in order 3 but the highest 
mean in order 1 (1.73 and 2.63 respectively). There was also a significant sex main 
effect, F (l,5 4 ) = 6.97, p  = .011, with women remembering more persons/occupations 
than men (2.73 and 2.26 respectively).
The analysis for the number of behaviors remembered was a 2 (Sex) X 2 (Order) 
X 3 (Trait) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. The main effect for trait 
was not significant. The mean recall for the behaviors in obnoxious sentences was 
highest (1.71) followed by the recall for behaviors in SCV sentences (1.70) and the recall 
for behaviors in dishonest sentences (1.54). There was a significant sex effect, F  (1,54) = 
4.82,/? = .032, with women remembering more behaviors than men (1.90 and 1.40 
respectively).
The analysis for the number of persons/occupation category matches was a 2 
(Sex) X 2 (Order) X 3 (Trait) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. As in 
the previous analysis, the main effect for trait was not significant. Contrary to prediction, 
the mean recall for the behaviors in obnoxious sentences was highest (1.37) followed by 
the recall for behaviors in dishonest sentences (1.13) and the recall for behaviors in SCV 
sentences (1.06). There was a significant order effect, F (l,5 4 ) = 3.173,/? = .05, 
participants viewing order 2 recalling more correct category matches than participants 
viewing order 1 or order 3 (1.41, 1.31, and 0.85 respectively).
The analysis for the number of persons/occupations matches with the exact 
behavior of the sentence was a 2 (Sex) X 2 (Order) X 3 (Trait) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor. There were no significant main effects or interactions. For
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the main effect for trait, a pattern similar to the previous analyses, emerged. The mean 
recall for the behaviors in obnoxious sentences was highest (1.29) followed by the recall 
for behaviors in dishonest sentences (1.05) and the recall for behaviors in SCV sentences 
(1.03).
I had predicted that the recall for sentences implying social contract violations 
would be the highest. However, across all four dependent measures recall for sentences 
implying obnoxiousness was highest. As in Study 3, in which sentences implying 
meanness had the highest recall, it is unclear why this is the case. Nevertheless, it is 
important to keep in mind that there were no significant results for the main effect for 
trait and that the pattern of means across the four dependent measures can only be viewed 
as an emerging trend.
CHAPTER V:
GERNERAL DISCUSSION
Across four studies my hypotheses received mixed support. Given that Studies 1 
and 2 have similar methodologies and Studies 3 and 4 have similar methodologies, I will 
discuss each pair in the two following subsections.
Studies 1 and 2
Results for Studies 1 and 2 were, for the most part, consistent with my 
hypotheses. For negative traits, the FAE was stronger for dishonest traits than for other 
negative traits. Thus, this is consistent with predictions derived from Social Exchange 
Theory, suggesting that the human mind has psychological mechanisms that were 
designed to detect cheaters. In examining positive traits, the direction of the FAE was 
reversed, thereby creating the mirror image of the effect for negative traits. People were 
more likely to attribute positive traits to themselves than others. However, as predicted, 
this effect was stronger for honest traits than other positive traits.
Thus, perhaps the Fundamental Attribution Error is perhaps not so fundamental 
after all. If the traditional, domain general version of the FAE had held up, there would 
have been a main effect for people (individuals attributing less traits to the self than to 
others) with no interaction by trait. However, it appears that participants did make the 
predicted distinctions between dishonest traits and other negative traits and between 
honest traits and other positive traits. This suggests that within negative traits and within 
positive traits, individuals view certain categories of traits as qualitatively different than •
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other traits. For negative traits, it can be suggested that individuals view dishonesty- 
related traits qualitatively differently because we have evolved psychological 
mechanisms dedicated to cheater-detection.
Studies 3 and 4
The results of Studies 3 and 4 were not consistent with my hypothesis that 
sentences about person/occupations engaging in dishonest behavior would be 
remembered better than other sentences involving other negative behaviors. In Study 3, 
sentences implying a mean disposition, rather than a dishonest disposition, were 
remembered better than other sentences. A sample sentence is, “The accountant steers 
the car into the puddle to splash you.” Upon further examination, it appears that in some 
of the mean sentences, the person/occupation is behaving aggressively toward the 
individual. Thus, it is possible that the mean sentences may be tapping into another 
domain (other than cheater-detection) that involves dominance and/or aggression—a 
domain in which different specialized mechanisms might be activated. Consequently, 
these sentences were replaced in Study 4 because this was not a domain on which I was 
focusing. Future research can examine the possibility of specialized mechanisms 
designed to remember dominant or aggressive individuals. In addition, there were 
particular sentences implying obnoxious dispositions that may have involved elements of 
dominance and/or aggression. Thus, as with the mean sentences, a few of the obnoxious 
sentences may have tapped into specialized domains other than cheater-detection. A 
sample sentence is, “The carpenter passes you using the emergency lane.”
In Study 4 sentences implying a social contract replaced the mean sentences 
because I thought that remembering dishonest individuals may not be a specific enough
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criterion. Based on examination of the dishonest sentences it appeared that people were 
remembering sentences that involved social contracts. Thus, in Study 4, I separated 
general dishonesty from social contract violations to examine whether individuals were 
better at remembering sentences that involved a social contract. However, the results 
were not consistent with this hypothesis.
One possibility for why the methodologies for Studies 1 and 2 produced predicted 
results but the methodologies for Studies 3 and 4 did not is that Studies 3 and 4 are really 
no longer about the FAE. My design of the studies started out focusing on the FAE but 
as the methodology went through more and more modifications, it moved farther away 
from testing the FAE. The original study by Winter & Uleman (1984) used dispositional 
cues to aid in sentence recall. Originally I was using this method to examine whether 
dishonest dispositional cues were better at eliciting sentence recall than other types of 
dispositional cues. However, in a pilot study it became clear that dispositional cues could 
not be used. Individuals were asked to read the sentences and write down what kind of 
person they thought the individual in the sentences was. For five of the dishonest 
sentences, the word dishonest was most frequently attributed to the person in the 
sentence. Thus, I would not have been able to use the same dispositional cue for five 
sentences. Once Studies 3 and 4 moved away from using dispositional cues, the studies 
were no longer testing the FAE, but testing memory for sentences.
It is also important to point out that the differences between the two pairs of 
studies is not just methodological but really different hypotheses being tested. Studies 1 
and 2 tested the differences in how readily people attribute a disposition, but Studies 3
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and 4 tested whether such attributions were remembered differently. It is possible that 
one could be true but not the other.
Limitations
In Studies 1 and 2, particular negative and positive traits were used to contrast 
with dishonesty and honesty. These traits were selected to control for valence. Thus, the 
particular traits selected were similar in likeability to dishonesty and honesty. However it 
is unclear whether the same results would be found using other traits.
Another potential problem with Studies 1 and 2 was that they used forced-choice 
paradigms. The participants were instructed to choose either the trait or “depends on the 
situation.” Even in Study 2, when the measurement was a continuous scale, participants 
essentially had to choose between these two alternatives. There was no option given for 
the trait not applying to the individual being described. This was a potential problem 
because several participants asked what they should do if the trait did not apply to the 
person at all.
Small sample size may have been another potential problem, particularly in 
Studies 1 and 2. In Studies 1 and 2, the overall sample size was adequate but I was not 
anticipating a three-way interaction and separating the sexes for further analyses. Thus, 
breaking down the sample by sex decreased the N for subsequent analyses.
Future Directions
One future direction is, as in Study 4 in which I made a distinction between 
general dishonesty and social contract violations, to separate dishonesty itself into more 
specific clustering themes (i.e., social contract violations, stealing, etc) to examine if 
subsets of dishonesty are viewed differently by participants, using similar methodologies
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as Studies 1 and 2. In particular it would be beneficial to examine possible sex 
differences with respect to different clusters of dishonest traits. For example, by having 
men and women make attributions about a person of the same sex versus a person of the 
opposite sex, with respect to dishonest traits associated with cheating in romantic 
relationships, it would be interesting to see if sex differences emerge. Based on the 
commitment bias (women tend to underinfer a man’s willingness to commit to a 
committed romantic relationship) found by Haselton & Buss (2000), I would predict that 
women would rate an opposite sex acquaintance as more dishonest than a same sex other. 
Consistent with the commitment bias, women should infer that men are dishonest (with 
respect to promiscuity traits) until they prove otherwise. EMT would suggest that it is 
less costly for a woman to overinfer dishonesty to an opposite sex acquaintance thereby 
avoiding the possible repercussions (i.e. a cheating mate) if the man is truly dishonest.
In addition, an interesting study to examine men’s differences in making 
attributions would be to have them make trait attributions about a same sex other and an 
opposite sex other with respect to dishonest traits associated with stealing resources. 
Based on Dominance Theory (Cummins, 1996), it could be suggested that men would 
rate same sex acquaintances as more dishonest than opposite sex others with respect to 
traits associated with stealing resources. Acquiring and maintaining resources is 
particularly important for men and men who have priority access to recourses also have 
priority access to reproductive opportunities (Cummins, 1996). Thus, there is intrasexual 
competition among males to gain and maintain priority access to resources. Therefore, 
men should attribute more dishonest traits (with respect to stealing resources) to same sex
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acquaintances than opposite sex acquaintances because men are competing with men for 
priority access to resources and are not competing with women.
An evolutionary approach led to the prediction and discovery of limitations of the 
generalizability of a well-known social-cognitive phenomenon. Other such phenomena 
might be revisited using an evolutionary approach. For example, research focusing on 
risky decision-making and losses and gains, can offer insights into how individuals solve 
such problems by examining whether certain problems are answered differently based on 
their content and how they relate to adaptive problems faced in our ancestral 
environments (Ermer, 2002; Ketelaar, 2002).
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a p p e n d ix  a  
t r a it  a d j e c t iv e  q u e s t io n n a ir e  STUDY 1
SELF
Lenient
2. - Dishonest
3. - — .. Supportive
4. _  Lazy
5. — Genuine
6. ===== Unassuming
7. ___  Honorable
8. _ =  Thoughtful
9. ____ Evasive
10. _  Untalented
11. —__ Attractive
12. ___  Fraudulent
13. -—— Ul-Mannered
14. - Trustworthy
15. ___. Sociable
16. ___  Cheater
17. — Future-Oriented
_ Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on
the situation
Unskilled
Cheerful
Straightforward
Incompetent
Sincere
Imaginative
Easygoing
Liar
Fair
Talkative
Mean
Friendly
Deceitful
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
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Friend
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 . 
7.
9.
10 .
11 .
12 .
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20 . 
21 .
Lenient
Dishonest
Supportive
Lazy
Genuine
Unassuming
Honorable
Thoughtful
Evasive
Untalented
Attractive
Fraudulent
Ill-Mannered
Trustworthy
Sociable
Cheater
Future-Oriented
Unskilled
Cheerful
Straightforward
Incompetent
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on
the situation
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22.__ ____ Sincere
23.__ ___  Imaginative
24. _ _ _  Easygoing
25.__ ____  Liar
26. _ _  Fair
27. _ _  Talkative
28.__ ___  Mean
29.__ ___ Friendly
30.__ ___  Deceitful
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
OTHER
Lenient
Dishonest
Supportive
Lazy
Genuine
Unassuming
Honorable
Thoughtful
Evasive
Untalented
Attractive
Fraudulent
Ill-Mannered
Trustworthy
Sociable
Cheater
Future-Oriented
Unskilled
Cheerful
Straightforward
Incompetent
_  Depends on 
the situation
_ Depends on 
the situation
_ Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on
the situation
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22. _ _ _  Sincere
23. Imaginative
24. ___ __ Easygoing
25. _____ Liar
26. ___ Fair
27. ___  Talkative
28- Mean
29. _ _ _  Friendly
30. Deceitful
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
Depends on 
the situation
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APPENDIX B 
TRAIT ADJECTIVE QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY 2
On a scale from 0 to 9 (0 being completely dependent on the situation 
and 9 being highly characteristic of you in general) please rate the degree 
to which each of the following characteristics describes you.
0------- 1------- 2------- 3------- 4------- 5------- 6------- 7------- 8------- 9
completely highly
dependent characteristic of
on situation self in general
SELF
1. ____ Kind 25. Cheater
2. Passive 26. Modest
3. Dishonest 27. Cruel
4. Traditional 28. Unpleasant
5. Understanding 29. Competent
6. Talented 30. Straightforward
7. Conservative 31. Rude
8. Mean 32. Sincere
9. ____ Genuine 33. Disagreeable
10. Ordinary 34. Warm
11. __Honorable 35. Loud-mouthed
12. Intelligent 36. ___ Knowledgeable
13. Conventional 37. Wise
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*4- Inconsiderate
^ __ __ Calm
16- Untrustworthy
1 2 .   Obnoxious
===== Considerate 
*9- Fraudulent
2°- _ =  Sympathetic
2 1 _ =  Ill-Mannered
22- Truthful
23.  ___  Vulgar
24. ____ _  Average
38 - = _  Quiet
39. ___  Normal
40. __ Liar
41.______ Fair
42. _____ Shy
43. Malicious
44- Friendly
45. Deceitful
46. ____  Humble
47. ___ _ Spiteful
48 • _____ Resourceful
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Please think of specific person that is a close friend of yours. Please think of 
a person that is the same sex as you that is from William & Mary. On a scale 
from 1 to 9 (0 being completely dependent on the situation and 9 being 
highly characteristic of the friend in general) please rate the degree to 
which each of the following characteristics describes your close friend.
o 1-------2------- 3------- 4------- 5------- 6------- 7--------8
completely 
dependent 
on situation
Close Friend
1. Kind 25. Cheater
2. Passive 26. Modest
3. Dishonest 27. Cruel
4. Traditional 28. Unpleasant
5. Understanding 29. Competent
6. Talented 30. Straightforward
7. Conservative 31. Rude
8. Mean 32. Sincere
9. Genuine 33. Disagreeable
10. Ordinarv 34. Warm
11. Honorable 35. Loud-mouthed
12. ___ _ Intelligent 36. Knowledgeable
13. Conventional 37. Wise
14.    Inconsiderate 38. _ _ _  Quiet
highly
characteristic of 
friend in general
15. Calm 39. Normal
Untrustworthy
Obnoxious
Considerate
Fraudulent
Sympathetic
Ill-Mannered
Truthful
Vulgar
Average
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
Liar
Fair
Shy
Malicious
Friendly
Deceitful
Humble
Spiteful
Resourceful
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Please think of a specific person that is an acquaintance of yours, someone 
you neither strongly like nor dislike. Please think of a person that is the
same sex as you that is from William & Mary. On a scale from 1 to 9 (0
being completely dependent on the situation and 9 being highly 
characteristic of the acquaintance in general) please rate the degree to 
which each of the following characteristics describes an acquaintance of 
yours.
0------- 1------- 2------- 3------- 4----- - 5 ------- 6------- 7------- 8--------9
completely highly
dependent characteristic of
on situation acquaintance
in general
Acquaintance
1. Kind 25. Cheater
2. Passive 26. Modest
3. Dishonest 27. Cruel
4. Traditional 28. _ Unpleasant
5. Understanding 29. Competent
6. Talented 30. Straightforward
7. Conservative 31. Rude
8. Mean 32. Sincere
9. Genuine 33. Disagreeable
10. Ordinary 34. Warm
11. Honorable 35. Loud-mouthed
12. Intelligent 36. Knowledgeable
13. Conventional 37. Wise
14.   Inconsiderate 38. ____ Quiet
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15. Calm
16._____  Untrustworthy
17.__ ____  Obnoxious
18.   Considerate
19. Fraudulent
20. Sympathetic
21. Ill-Mannered
22.__ ____  Truthful
23.______ Vulgar
24. Average
39. ____ Normal
40. Liar
41. Fair
42. __   Shy
43. ___  Malicious
44. Friendly
43. _ _  Deceitful
46.    Humble
47. Spiteful
48. Resourceful
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Please think of a specific person you know that you dislike. Please think of a 
person that is the same sex as you that is from William & Mary. On a scale 
from 1 to 9 (0 being completely dependent on the situation and 9 being 
highly characteristic of the disliked other in general) please rate the 
degree to which each of the following characteristics describes a person that 
you dislike.
0------- 1------- 2------- 3------- 4------- 5------- 6------- 7------- 8—
completely 
dependent 
on situation
Disliked Other
1. Kind 25. Cheater
2. Passive 26. Modest
3. Dishonest 27. Cruel
4. Traditional 28. Unpleasant
5. Understanding 29. _ _ Competent
6. Talented 30. Straightforward
7. Conservative 31. Rude
8- ___Mean 32. ___ _ Sincere
9. _ __ Genuine 33. Disagreeable
10. Ordinary 34. Warm
*1. _ Honorable 35. __ Loud-mouthed
12. ____ Intelligent 36. Knowledgeable
13. __ Conventional 37. Wise
14- _ _  Inconsiderate 38. ___ _ Quiet
15. Calm 39. Normal
highly
characteristic of 
disliked other 
in general
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16. Untrustworthy 40. Liar
17. ____  Obnoxious 41. ____ Fair
18. Considerate 42. __ _ Shy
19. Fraudulent 43. Malicious
20. Sympathetic 44. __ = Friendly
21. _ _  Ill-Mannered 45. ___  Deceitful
22. _ _ _  Truthful 46. ____ Humble
23. Vulgar 47. __ _ Spiteful
24. ____ Average 48. Resourceful
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APPENDIX C 
MEMORY TASK STIMULI STUDY 3
ORDER 1
The accountant steers the car into the puddle to splash you.
The receptionist cuts in front of you in line.
The crossing guard borrows money from you with no intention of repaying it.
The butcher eavesdrops on your conversation.
The salesperson makes an expensive long-distance phone call on your phone without 
telling you.
The plumber insults you for no good reason.
The sailor splits the cost of a lottery ticket with you and keeps all the winnings.
The chauffer laughs at you when you fall and hurt yourself.
The carpenter passes you using the emergency lane.
The farmer refuses to help pick up the papers he knocked out of your hands.
The waitress fails to give you gas money for a long trip.
The architect talks on a cell phone during the entire movie you are attending.
The reporter cheats while playing cards with you.
The elevator-operator repeatedly tells you tasteless jokes.
The librarian spreads ugly rumors about you.
The tailor picks his teeth during dinner with you at a fancy restaurant.
The gardener belittles you in front of your friends.
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The mechanic takes money from your bag.
The pianist pushes you out of the way to get to a cab.
The electrician fails to give you the credit you deserve for your work on a project.
The fisherman repeatedly interrupts you while you are talking.
ORDER 2
The carpenter passes you using the emergency lane.
The electrician fails to give you the credit you deserve for your work on a project.
The chauffer laughs at you when you fall and hurt yourself.
The tailor picks his teeth during dinner with you at a fancy restaurant.
The waitress fails to give you gas money for a long trip.
The pianist pushes you out of the way to get to a cab.
The butcher eavesdrops on your conversation.
The reporter cheats while playing cards with you.
The gardener belittles you in front of your friends.
The elevator-operator repeatedly tells you tasteless jokes.
The librarian spreads ugly rumors about you.
The salesperson makes an expensive long-distance phone call on your phone without 
telling you.
The accountant steers the car into the puddle to splash you.
The sailor splits the cost of a lottery ticket with you and keeps all the winnings.
The fisherman repeatedly interrupts you while you are talking.
The crossing guard borrows money from you with no intention of repaying it.
The farmer refuses to help pick up the papers he knocked out of your hands.
The architect talks on a cell phone during the entire movie you are attending. 
The plumber insults you for no good reason.
The receptionist cuts in front of you in line.
The mechanic takes money from your bag.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ANAGRAM TASK (DISTRACTOR TASK)
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An Anagram is a word or phrase formed by rearranging the letters 
of another word or phrase. For exampe, Elvis to Lives.
On the next two slide you will see 6 anagrams, three on each slide.
For each word, rearrange the letters to form a new word or phrase. 
You will have 1 minute per slide.
Anagrams
Recede = Decree
Listen = Silent
Vowels = Wolves
Friend = Finder
Oceans = Canoes
Trains = Strains 
Looped = Poodle
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MEMORY TASK RECALL SHEET STUDIES 1 AND 2
1. From the sentences previously viewed, please list the all the people (i.e., 
occupations) you remember. It is okay if you cannot remember what they did.
2. From the sentences previously viewed, please list as many of the behaviors as you can. 
It is okay if you cannot remember who did the behavior.
3. Now, as best you can, please draw a line to match each person you listed with his or 
her corresponding behavior.
Person/Occupation Behavior
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APPENDIX D
MEMORY TASK STIMULI STUDY 4
ORDER 1
The teacher leaves your coat on the bus.
The architect steps on your feet while you dance.
The truck driver forgets to pass on a message to you.
The receptionist does not laugh at any of your jokes.
The chef borrows money from you and never pays it back.
The engineer cancels plans with you pretending to be sick and goes and plays golf.
The crossing guard repeatedly interrupts you while you are talking.
The reporter cuts in front of you in line.
The fisherman lies to you about a deadline so you miss it.
The plumber makes expensive long-distance phone calls on your phone without telling 
you.
The pianist scratches your car and says someone else did it.
The editor shares an apartment with you and never pays rent.
The electrician eavesdrops on your conversation.
The farmer takes money from your bag.
The carpenter picks his teeth during dinner with you at a fancy restaurant.
The gardener splits the cost of a lottery ticket with you and keeps all the winnings.
The flight attendant agrees to pay you for mowing the lawn and never does.
The accountant passes you using the emergency lane.
The coach takes your newspaper without asking.
The butcher repeatedly tells you tasteless jokes.
The librarian fails to give you gas money for a long trip.
The technician cheats while playing cards with you.
The tailor knowingly writes you a bad check for the CD player you sell.
The chauffer steals your idea and claims it as her own.
The mechanic talks on a cell phone during a movie you are attending.
The sailor buys you a cheap gift for your birthday.
The waitress is unenthusiastic about your project.
The salesperson watches TV instead of going out with you.
The elevator-operator breaks your computer because he does not know how to work it.
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ORDER 2
The librarian leaves your coat on the bus.
The elevator-operator does not laugh at any of your jokes.
The receptionist steps on your feet while you dance.
The crossing guard forgets to pass on a message to you.
The mechanic repeatedly tells you tasteless jokes.
The carpenter agrees to pay you for mowing the lawn and never does.
The pianist takes money from your bag.
The butcher knowingly writes you a bad check for the CD player you sell.
The engineer cheats while playing cards with you.
The editor passes you using the emergency lane.
The salesperson takes your newspaper without asking.
The tailor repeatedly interrupts you while you are talking.
The architect fails to give you gas money for a long trip.
The chef talks on a cell phone during a movie you are attending.
The waitress steals your idea and claims it as her own.
The fisherman borrows money from you and never pays it back.
The farmer makes expensive long-distance phone calls on your phone without telling 
you.
The sailor cuts in front of you in line.
The gardener cancels plans with you pretending to be sick and goes and plays golf. 
The plumber scratches your car and says someone else did it.
The chauffer shares an apartment with you and never pays rent.
The reporter picks his teeth during dinner with you at a fancy restaurant.
The electrician splits the cost of a lottery ticket with you and keeps all the winnings. 
The truck driver lies to you about a deadline so you miss it.
The accountant eavesdrops on your conversation.
The teacher breaks your computer because he does not know how to work it.
The technician watches TV instead of going out with you.
The coach is unenthusiastic about your project.
The flight attendant buys you a cheap gift for your birthday.
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ORDER 3
The chauffer leaves your coat on the bus.
The elevator-operator does not laugh at any of your jokes.
The receptionist steps on your feet while you dance.
The salesperson forgets to pass on a message to you.
The tailor fails to give you gas money for a long trip.
The gardener lies to you about a deadline so you miss it.
The sailor picks his teeth during dinner with you at a fancy restaurant.
The electrician steals your idea and claims it as her own.
The technician repeatedly tells you tasteless jokes.
The pianist splits the cost of a lottery ticket with you and keeps all the winnings.
The coach cuts in front of you in line.
The fisherman cheats while playing cards with you.
The librarian agrees to pay you for mowing the lawn and never does.
The accountant cancels plans with you pretending to be sick and goes and plays golf 
The reporter shares an apartment with you and never pays rent.
The engineer passes you using the emergency lane.
The architect knowingly writes you a bad check for the CD player you sell.
The plumber takes money from your bag.
The waitress talks on a cell phone during a movie you are attending.
The carpenter eavesdrops on your conversation.
The crossing guard takes your newspaper without asking.
The mechanic borrows money from you and never pays it back.
The editor scratches your car and says someone else did it.
The chef makes expensive long-distance phone calls on your phone without telling you. 
The farmer repeatedly interrupts you while you are talking.
The teacher breaks your computer because he does not know how to work it.
The truck driver watches TV instead of going out with you.
The flight attendant is unenthusiastic about your project.
The butcher buys you a cheap gift for your birthday.
NOTES
1. Multivariate tests were used to test the within subjects effects. In these 
analyses, the multivariate tests were all in exact agreement and corresponded to the F- 
tests.
2. Multivariate tests were used to test the within subjects effects. In these 
analyses, the multivariate tests were all in exact agreement and corresponded to the F- 
tests.
3. Unlike the original study, no type of retrieval cue was used in the present 
study. Originally the study was to use dispositional traits to cue recall but a pretest 
asking individuals to use the word that best describes the person in the sentence, 
indicated that for the sentences implying dishonesty, the word dishonest was the trait that 
was most frequently used for a majority of the sentences. Thus, I was not able to use 
dispositional cues.
4. Multivariate tests were used to test the within subjects effects. In these 
analyses, the multivariate tests were all in exact agreement and corresponded to the F- 
tests.
5. One participant did not include his or her age.
6. Multivariate tests were used to test the within subjects effects. In these 
analyses, the multivariate tests were all in exact agreement and corresponded to the F- 
tests.
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TABLE 1
MEAN NUMBER OF DISHONEST AND OTHER NEGATIVE TRAITS ATTRIBUTED 
TO SELF, FRIEND, AND OTHER IN STUDY 1
Sex Trait Mean Std. Dev N
Self
Dishonest
Men
Other Negative
.42
.35
.64
.56
26
26
Dishonest
Women
Other Negative
.05
.24
.22
.44
21
21
Dishonest
Men
.23 .65 26
Other Negative .30 .60 26
Friend
Dishonest
Women
.38 1.12 21
Other Negative .29 .64 21
Dishonest
Men
.50 1.27 26
Other Negative .62 1.33 26
Other
Dishonest
Women
.71 1.42 21
Other Negative .38 .80 21
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TABLE 2
MEAN NUMBER OF HONEST AND OTHER POSITIVE TRAITS ATTRIBUTED 
TO SELF, FRIEND, AND OTHER IN STUDY 1
Sex Trait Mean Std. Dev N
Honest
Men
4.54 2.02 26
Other Positive 4.04 1.51 26
Self
Honest
Women
4.86 1.62 21
Other Positive 3.86 1.88 21
Honest
Men
4.81 1.52 26
Other Positive 4.58 1.53 26
Friend
Honest
Women
4.62 1.75 21
Other Positive 5.05 1.28 21
Honest
Men
3.42 2.14 26
Other Positive 3.16 1.64 26
Other
Honest
Women
2.95 2.16 21
Other Positive 3.90 1.41 21
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TABLE 3
MEAN RATING OF DISHONEST AND OTHER NEGATIVE TRAITS ATTRIBUTED 
TO SELF, FRIEND, AND ACQUAINTANCE IN STUDY 2
Sex Trait Mean Std. Dev N
Dishonest 1.47 1.01 27
Men
Other Negative 2.43 1.61 27
Self
Dishonest 1.23 1.49 32
Women
Other Negative 1.72 1.10 32
Dishonest 1.44 1.51 27
Men
Other Negative 1.80 1.21 27
Friend
Dishonest .70 .66 32
Women
Other Negative 1.57 1.10 32
Dishonest 2.44 1.92 27
Men
Other Negative 2.19 1.54 27
Acquaintance
Dishonest 1.45 1.44 32
Women
Other Negative 1.61 1.13 32
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TABLE 4
MEAN RATING OF HONEST AND OTHER POSITIVE TRAITS ATTRIBUTED 
TO SELF, FRIEND, AND ACQUAINTANCE IN STUDY 2
Sex Trait Mean Std. Dev N
Self
Honest
Men
Other Positive
6.74
6.76
.98
.92
27
27
Honest
Women
Other Positive
6.93
6.96
1.13
1.07
32
32
Honest 7.16 1.02 27
Men
Other Positive 7.00 .92 27
Friend
Honest 7.21 1.17 32
Women
Other Positive 7.05 .90 32
Honest 5.77 1.35 27
Men
Other Positive 6.12 .96 27
Acquaintance
Honest 5.79 1.57 32
Women
Other Positive 6.04 1.49 32
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TABLE 5
NUMBER OF PEOPLE/OCCUPATIONS REMEMBERED CORRECTLY FOR
EACH CATEGORY IN STUDY 3
Order Sex Mean Std. Dev N
1
Males 2.57 1.27 7
Dishonest
Females 2.50 1.65 10
2
Males 2.22 1.09 9
Females 2.86 1.07 7
1
Males 3.00 1.29 7
Mean
Females 3.90 0.99 10
2
Males 3.00 0.87 9
Females 3.43 1.51 7
1
Males 2.43 1.72 7
Obnoxious
Females 3.30 1.16 10
2
Males 3,11 1.83 9
Females 2.57 1.27 7
75
TABLE 6
NUMBER OF BEHAVIORS REMEMBERED CORRECTLY FOR 
EACH CATEGORY IN STUDY 3
Order Sex Mean Std. Dev N
Dishonest
1
Males
Females
1.86
2.20
1.57 7 
1.03 10
2
Males
Females
1.78
2.00
0.67 9 
1.73 7
Mean
1
Males
Females
2.29
3.00
0.76 7 
1.41 10
2
Males
Females
2.67
1.57
1.50 9 
0.98 7
Obnoxious
1
Males
Females
1.43
2.40
1.72 7 
1.78 10
2
Males
Females
1.67
1.57
1.50 9 
0.98 7
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TABLE 7
NUMBER OF PEOPLE/OCCUPATIONS REMEMBERED WITH 
THE CORRECT BEHAVIOR CATEGORY MATCH IN STUDY 3
Order Sex Mean Std. Dev N
1
Males 1.29 1.11 7
Females 1.50 1.18 10
Dishonest
2
Males 0.78 0.83 9
Females 0.86 0.90 7
1
Males 1.86 1.07 7
Females 2.30 1.57 10
Mean
2
Males 1.44 0.88 9
Females 1.00 1.00 7
1
Males 1.14 1.46 7
Females 1.90 1.20 10
Obnoxious
2
Males 1.11 1.05 9
Females 0.86 1.07 7
TABLE 8
NUMBER OF PEOPLE/OCCUPATIONS REMEMBERED CORRECTLY
MATCHED WITH THE EXACT BEHAVIOR IN STUDY 3
Order Sex Mean Std. Dev N
Dishonest
1
Males
Females
1.29
1.50
111 7 
1.18 10
2
Males
Females
0.67
0.71
0.71 9 
0.95 7
Mean
1
Males
Females
1.86
2.10
1.07 7 
1.60 10
2
Males
Females
1.44
0.86
0.88 9 
1.07 7
Obnoxious
1
Males
Females
1.14
1.90
1.46 7 
1.20 10
2
Males
Females
1.11
0.71
1.05 9 
0.76 7
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TABLE 9
FREQUENCIES FOR CATEGORY MATCHES AND EXACT MATCHES FOR 
SENTENCES IMPLYING A DISHONEST DISPOSITION
Dishonest Sentences Order 1 Order 2 Total
The Crossing guard borrows money from you with not
intention of repaying it. 2 3 5
The salesperson makes an expensive long-distance call on 
your phone without telling you. 5 4(3) 9(8)
The sailor bought a lottery ticket with you and keeps all 
the money after the ticket wins. 4 3(2) 7(6)
The waitress fails to give you gas money for a long trip. 4 3 7
The reporter cheats while playing cards with you. 2 0 2
The mechanic takes money from your bag. 4 0 4
The electrician fails to give you the credit you deserve for
your work on a project. 3 0 3
Note. The number of exact matches is in parentheses if it is different from the number of 
category matches.
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TABLE 10
NUMBER OF PEOPLE/OCCUPATIONS REMEMBERED CORRECTLY FOR
EACH CATEGORY IN STUDY 4
Order Sex Mean Std. Dev N
Males 2.25 1.42 12
1
Females 3.00 1.51 8
Males 2.88 0.99 8
Cheaters 2
Females 2.67 1.00 9
Males 1.46 1.45 13
3
Females 2.00 1.63 10
Males 1.58 0.90 12
1
Females 2.13 1.25 8
Males 3.00 1.41 8
Dishonest 2
Females 2.88 0.93 9
Males 2.69 1.49 13
3
Females 2.60 1.08 10
Males 2.50 1.09 12
1
Females 2.75 1.04 8
Males 2.13 1.13 8
Obnoxious 2
Females 3.22 1.09 9
Males 1.85 0.99 13
3
Females 3.30 1.06 10
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TABLE 11
NUMBER OF BEHAVIORS REMEMBERED CORRECTLY FOR
EACH CATEGORY IN STUDY 4
Order Sex Mean Std. Dev N
Males 1.83 1.53 12
1
Females 2.25 0.89 8
Males 1.38 1.51 8
Cheaters 2
Females 2.11 1.45 9
Males 0.85 1.14 13
3
Females 1.80 1.40 10
Males 1.17 1.03 12
1
Females 1.63 1.06 8
Males 1.88 1.81 8
Dishonest 2
Females 2.11 1.17 9
Males 1.54 1.39 13
3
Females 0.90 0.88 10
Males 1.67 1.30 12
1
Females 2.25 1.39 8
Males 1.25 1.28 8
Obnoxious 2
Females 2.22 1.30 9
Males 1.08 1.32 13
3
Females 1.80 1.48 10
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TABLE 12
NUMBER OF PEOPLE/OCCUPATIONS REMEMBERED WITH 
THE CORRECT BEHAVIOR CATEGORY MATCH IN STUDY 4
Order Sex Mean Std. Dev N
Males 1.25 1.22 12
1
Females 1.63 0.92 8
Males 0.88 1.13 8
Cheaters 2
Females 1.56 1.33 9
Males 0.23 0.44 13
3
Females 0.80 1.32 10
Males 0.75 0.87 12
1
Females 1.13 1.36 8
Males 1.75 1.83 8
Dishonest 2
Females 1.44 1.13 9
Males 1.23 1.30 13
3
Females 0.50 0.53 10
Males 1.33 1.07 12
1
Females 1.75 1.17 8
Males 1.25 1.29 8
Obnoxious 2
Females 1.56 1.42 9
Males 0.85 1.07 13
3
Females 1.50 1.18 10
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TABLE 13
NUMBER OF PEOPLE/OCCUPATIONS REMEMBERED CORRECTLY
MATCHED WITH THE EXACT BEHAVIOR IN STUDY 4
Order Sex Mean Std. Dev N
Males 1.25 1.22 12
1
Females 1.63 0.92 8
Males 0.88 1.13 8
Cheaters 2
Females 1.44 1.23 9
Males 0.23 0.44 13
3
Females 0.80 1.32 10
Males 0.67 0.78 12
1
Females 1.13 1.36 8
Males 1.75 1.83 8
Dishonest 2
Females 1.22 1.09 9
Males 1.15 1.21 13
3
Females 0.40 0.52 10
Males 1.08 1.16 12
1
Females 1.75 1.17 8
Males 1.13 1.36 8
Obnoxious 2
Females 1.56 1.42 9
Males 0.85 1.07 13
3
Females 1.40 1.17 10
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FIGURE CAPTION 
Figure F. Trait x Target Interaction for Negative Traits, Study 1 (Women Only)
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FIGURE CAPTION
Figure 2. Trait x Target Interaction for Positive Traits, Study 1 (Men and Women Combined)
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FIGURE CAPTION
Figure 3. Trait x Target Interaction for Negative Traits, Study 2 (Men and Women Combined)
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FIGURE CAPTION
Figure 4. Trait x Target Interaction for Positive Traits, Study 2 (Men and Women Combined)
7.
50 oo o oo oO <~n o  m O
o-’ vb v/S tri
SJl^iX JO SuiJFtf UB9]A[
Se
lf 
Fr
ien
d 
A
cq
ua
in
ta
nc
e
Ta
rg
et
References
Alicke, M. D., Zerbst, J. I., LoSchiavo, F. M. (1996). Personal attitudes, constraints,
magnitude, and correspondence bias. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 18, 
211-228.
Anderson, N. H. (1968). Likableness ratings of 555 personality-trait words. Journal o f  
Personality and Social Psychology, 9, 272-279.
Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution o f Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how 
humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. Cognition, 31, 187-276.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In J. 
Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary 
psychology and the generation o f culture (pp. 163-228). New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all?
Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty. 
Cognitiona 58, 1-73.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1997). Evolutionary psychology: A primer. Available at 
URL: psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/
Cosmides, L., Klein, S. B., & Tooby, J. (2002, June). Are there cognitive adaptations for 
learning about one’s own personality: Neuropsychological evidence for
91
92
specialized learning storage, and retrieval systems. Paper presented as the 
meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society, New Brunswick, NJ.
Cummins, D. D. (1996). Dominance hierarchies and the evolution of human reasoning. 
Minds and Machines, 6, 463-480.
DeKay, W. T., Haselton, M. G., & Kirkpatrick, L. A. (2000). Reversing Figure and
Ground in the Rationality Debate: An evolutionary perspective. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 23, 670-671.
Ermer, E. (2002, June). Losses, gains, and status in risky decision-making. Paper
presented as the meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society, New 
Brunswick, NJ.
Haselton, M. G., Buss, D. M. (2000). Error management theory: A new perspective on 
biases in cross-sex mind reading. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 
78, 81-91.
Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. Journal o f Experimental 
Social Psychology, 3, 1-24.
Jones, E. E., Worchel, S., Goethals, G. R., & Grumet, J. F. (1971). Prior expectancy and 
behavioral extremity as determinants of attitude attribution. Journal o f 
Experimental Social Psychology, 7, 59-80.
Kahneman. D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological 
Reviewa 80x 23 7-251.
Kahneman. D. & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions: A reply to 
Gigerenzer’s critique. Psychological Review, 103, 582-591.
93
Ketelaar, T. (2002, June). Perception of gains and losses: Adaptive designs and bird­
brained utility functions. Paper presented as the meeting of the Human Behavior 
and Evolution Society, New Brunswick, NJ.
Leahey, T. L. & Harris, R. J. (Eds). (1997). Long-term memory. Learning and 
Cognition (pp. 132-165). (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Mineka, S. (1992). Evolutionary memories, emotional processing, and the emotional
disorders. In D. Meding (Ed.), The Psychology o f Learning and Motivation, (pp. 
161-206). Vol. 28. New York: Academic Press.
Nisbett, R. E., Caputo, C., Legant, P., & Maracek, J. (1973). Behavior as seen by the
actor and as seen by the observer. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 
27, 154-164.
Ross, L., Anabile, T. M., & Steinmetz, J. L. (1977). Social roles, social control, and 
biases in social-perception processes. Journal o f Personality and Social 
Psychology, 35, 485-494.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning:
Implications for the rationality debate? Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 23, 645- 
726.
Thomson, D. M., & Tulving, E. (1970). Associative encoding and retrieval: Weak and 
strong cues. Journal o f Experimental Psychology, 86, 255-262.
Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1992). The psychological foundations of culture. In J. 
Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.) The adapted mind: Evolutionary 
psychology and the generation o f culture (19-136). New York: Oxford University 
Press.
94
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review o f Biology, 
46, 35-57.
Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in 
episodic memory. Psychological Review, 80, 352-373.
Wason, P. C. (1966). Reasoning. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), New horizons in psychology (pp.
135-151). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Winter, L., & Uleman, J. S. (1984). When are social judgments made? Evidence for the 
spontaneousness of trait inferences. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 
237-252.
VITA
Brandy N. Burkett
Born in Baltimore, Maryland, January 7, 1978. Graduated from Kennard-Dale 
High School in Fawn Grove, Pennsylvania, June 1996. Graduated from Franklin & 
Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, May 2000.
In August 2000, the author entered the College of William & Mary as a graduate 
student in the department of psychology.
95
